Wednesday, June 8, 2016

Copa Round One Wrap Up

I'm a couple days late, but these are a some assorted thoughts on the first round of group games in Copa America.

Mexico's Offense
Easily the best game of the first round, Mexico-Uruguay was thrilling and intense. The flow of the game shifted several times, with Mexico dominating the match aside from a 20-30 minute period early in the second half. Uruguay was able to claw their way into the game, after going a man and a goal down, but the energy they spent to do so was unsustainable, and they eventually cracked (mentally, physically and tactically).

Mexico was fascinating and massively impressive. They frankly looked like the best team in the tournament (and maybe all of the Americas), including even Argentina (not so sure about this, but it's pretty close). Juan Carlos Osorio had the team playing like a club side that has trained together for months, and it was stunning.

Their build up shape was what most interested me. Their nominal lineup was a 4-3-3,

But Mexico played a much more fluid and dynamic formation than it appeared on paper. The most notable and confusing movement came out of defense. Reyes, the left center back, pushed into midfield, while Rafa Marquez, the nominal pivot, dropped back; they effectively traded roles. Moreno, at left back, played a little more centrally, while Araujo at right centerback pushed out wider. Layun moved into midfield, leaving a back three of Moreno, Marquez and Araujo. This is sort of what resulted.
However, this is just a snapshot of a moment. The midfield and forward lines were very fluid, with much freedom of movement. As Istvan Beregi points out, the formation occasionally appeared as a 3-1-4-2, which had its benefits...


and its shortcomings.


In the first half, Mexico dominated the match, completely outclassing Uruguay. They shut off for a while in the second, but once they needed a goal to win, they once again pinned Uruguay back. It isn't often that a great defensive team like Uruguay, with a defensive core from Atletico Madrid, is torn apart like they were in the first half. I'm super excited to see Mexico's other games, and see how they pan out.

Argentina's Counter Attack
The second best game of the first round was Argentina-Chile. Although Messi was left on the bench, recovering from injury and a trans-Atlantic flight, Argentina won the game easily.

Chile held most of the ball, particularly in the second half, but had some build up issues (see linked article), as well as the Argentine defense. Argentina, in a different role from normal, spent much of the game, after the first 20 minutes, defending and looking to break out on the counter attack. It was a strategic move that suited the Argentine side very well.

Chile were especially vulnerable on the flanks, where Angel Di Maria especially found great success attacking for Argentina. Even though they were defending, Argentina weren't passive at all, pressing Chile's center backs and disrupting their build up play.

The second half especially was a master class in counter attacking, as Argentina quickly broke from turnovers to win chances on goal. Chile's build up shape, with 3-4 players on the front line, put them in a poor position to counterpress, leaving the backline vulnerable to counters.

I'm interested to see whether Argentina continue to play more on the counter in the future. With Messi returning, and facing opponents who will likely cede possession to Argentina, I would expect Argentina to play more possessive soccer. But I would love to see more of the strategy from Argentina that we saw against Chile, most likely in the later stages of the tournament.

Poor Turnout
A lot of the talk from the first round has been on the quality of games, and the empty stadiums watching them. People have been wondering why the games have been more boring and defensive, especially given the pre-tournament hype. I think one of the most important reasons is the lack of down time between the end of the club season and the start of the tournament. The Euros are starting a whole week later, giving extra time for teams to train and players to rest. Players in Copa may simply be worn out, and not have the energy to slave through 108 degree weather in Orlando.

The low turnout at stadiums may be due to a lack of excitement about the competition. I mean realistically, how many people want to spend their Saturday afternoon watching Paraguay-Costa Rica or Haiti-Peru? It doesn't help that this tournament is largely viewed as a bunch of friendlies strung together, at worst, or a nice trophy at best. I think people simply aren't excited, and the lack of exciting play (outside of two games) doesn't help.

  

Saturday, June 4, 2016

Copa America Day One

I will be *trying* to do a wrap-up of each day of soccer action this summer, between the Euros and Copa America. I won't see every game, so I'll post about the ones I did see.

The opening day of Copa America Centenario featured the hosts, the US, and Colombia facing off in Santa Clara, California. It was a slightly disappointing game, as both teams failed to create good chances out of open play. However, the match was still interesting tactically and in a greater sense. Full confession, as an American I can't help focusing on my team. This post will greatly focus on the US team, but I'll try to talk about Colombia some.

American Build Up Play
One of the most interesting (and encouraging) aspects of the game was the US team's build up play. While Colombia dominated the first 10 minutes of the game in possession, after they scored in the 9th minute on a corner, the Americans increasingly controlled the match. For most of the first half after Colombia's first goal, the US had the ball and dictated play.

A big feature of this build up was the use of vertical passing. Colombia defended in a 4-4-2, with the two strikers fairly narrow to keep Michael Bradley, in the pivot, off the ball. This opened up room in the half spaces for John Brooks and Geoff Cameron, the American center backs, to dribble into and make passes. The inward movements of both American wingers, Gyasi Zardes and Bobby Wood, as well as the two wide midfielders, Alejandro Bedoya and Jermaine Jones, opened up targets for passing.

The Colombians didn't do a fantastic job of stopping these movements and passes, although they were able to spring traps on a few occasions, like the one below.


However, the Americans for the most part were able to get around Colombia's defense in midfield, particularly in getting the ball to Bradley, as the deep lying playmaker. With the front 2 blocking immediate access to Bradley initially, the centerbacks often shifted the ball between themselves, or out to the fullbacks, to open the Colombians up.

Often Clint Dempsey, as the striker, would drop off the front line into the 10 spot, left open by the US. This opened a vertical passing lane for the centerbacks, and Dempsey, when he received the ball, would often lay it off to Bradley, working around Colombia's defense. The clip below shows just such a move, as Brooks passes to Dempsey, who lays it off to Bradley.

Both team's focus on Michael Bradley, offensively and defensively, demonstrates how important he is to the US. Much of the debate about the national team in the past two years has focused on where Michael Bradley ought to play. Jurgen Klinnsmann has tried him in a more advanced role, a no. 10, but Bradley was ineffective and marginalized there. Klinnsmann then moved him back, deeper into the midfield, where Bradley plays best. 

Against Colombia, however, Bradley was horrid. I am more optimistic about his build up play in the game than many other people are, but it wasn't what the Americans needed. Offensively, much of the Americans play did end up going through people other than Bradley, and I felt that when he did have the ball he was too slow and indecisive to make an impact. Defensively he made several key errors, including the turnover that lead to Colombia's second goal. He fouled in very odd places, and looked somewhat out of sorts.

USA Defense
Defensively I was also impressed with the US. They were set up well, and gave the Colombians very few chances. Indeed, both goals came out of set pieces, although the penalty was the result of some poor open play defending.

The US defended high up the field in a 4-3-3. They were fairly compact through the center, and front to back, as the backline pushed up, nearly to the midway line. However, the front 3 of the US team didn't put any pressure on the ball. This is partly due to Colombia having a 2 v.1/3 v. 1 overload in the first line, and also due to Dempsey's age and lack of energy. But America still did a poor job of pressuring the Colombian's build up, until the ball progressed into midfield.

There you can see how high the front 3 for America are, yet they are not pressuring the ball. Dempsey was particularly relaxed, and I think Klinnsmann would have been wise to take Dempsey off instead of Bobby Wood (see below).

Deeper into the field, the US would occasionally drop into a 4-4-2, particularly with the ball on the wing. The image below demonstrates this: the midfield three has flattened, with Jones shifting out to the wing. Meanwhile, the ball-far winger (Zardes) has dropped into the midfield line, leaving two attackers up front.

Overall the US defended very well. The Colombians had very few chances from open play, and James Rodriguez, always a threat, made very little impact on the game. The backline particularly impressed me. I really liked the Brooks-Cameron partnership, and although Cameron falling asleep let Colombia score their first, both centerbacks were very good.

Colombia
I've said most of what I have to say about Colombia already, but there are several things I haven't mentioned. Firstly, this was not a match for Colombia to be proud of. There has been talk that Colombia "dominated the game without the ball." I couldn't disagree with this statement more: Colombia did not put in an Simeone-esque performance, dictating where the offensive team would play. Although the Americans struggled to create chances and covert good build up to good attacks, this is prominently due to American problems, not Colombian defense. Colombia's defense was open very often and did a poor job of covering the half spaces.

In possession, Colombia weren't much better. They struggled to play through America, and although they were slightly more successful than the US in terms of chance creation, they struggled there as well. In the end, Colombia executed of a set piece better, and then won a penalty, and that's how they won the game. 

Conclusion
This was obviously a very disappointing result for the US. Depending on how the Costa Rica-Paraguay game goes later today, the result could be slightly better or worse. But, in terms of underlying factors, I was more optimistic. Bradley *should* play better than he did today, and the US did a good job of getting him the ball. I liked the midfield trio, and thought they did a good job facilitating build up. The front three were disappointing, and since all three are central forwards, they often neutralized the others strengths. The defense was impressive, especially in terms of the backline, and I think as they clock more minutes in together they will get better. 

The major problem for Klinnsmann coming out of this game (other than the result) is that of offensive personnel. The US seriously lacked creativity and chances against Colombia. He could start either one, or both, of Christian Pulisic or Darlington Nagbe, two no. 10's. But he needs to make a change, because America's attack was poor. 

The US is not out of this tournament, but the loss puts them into a very tough position. The pressure on Klinnsmann is rising, although I personally believe that he coached a decent match. I think some of the pessimitic responses to this match are simply cyncical, and while it was not a good result, the positives are pretty clear. This was one of the first times we've seen America play something resembling the possession based, attacking soccer Klinnsmann promised. The good build up play shows the foundation of this soccer are being laid, and I think that should be encouraging.


Monday, May 30, 2016

Best Matches of Copa America Centenario: Group Stage

The celebratory 100th Copa America starts on Friday, and although it won't be as intense as the Euro's (starting next week), it should promise to be interesting at the least. And while Neymar isn't making the trip, many other big stars, including Suarez, Messi and Aguero will be at the tournament. Teams, particularly the South Americans, may not see the Centenario as a must win deal, but they do see it as a potentially nice trophy (especially Argentina, who can't be picky after 23 years without a senior trophy).
Image result for copa america groups

The three weeks of the group stage are packed with interesting games, and as the tournament gets going and we see how teams are playing, there could be more and more. I'm looking at what *right now* are the best games of the group stage.

USA v. Colombia (June 3rd, 9:30)
The opening match of the tournament, in Santa Clara. USA have tons to prove, as the hosts and in general. Obviously, as host nation, USA wants to put out a good showing, and prove to the South Americans that they can run with real teams. This tournament also provides a good chance to build on the success of the 2014 World Cup, when the US barely lost in the Round of 16, 2-1 to Belgium in extra time.

For Jurgen Klinsmann though, this tournament provides a chance to relieve some pressure. Between a fourth place finish at the Gold Cup last summer, losing the chance to automatically qualify for the Confederations Cup, a major goal for Klinsmann, and then a loss in the Confed Cup playoff to Mexico, and then struggles in the early stages of World Cup qualifying, and then the failure of the U-23 team to qualify for the Olympics, 2015-16 has not been a great year for Klinsmann. If the US could make a run in this tournament, and maybe even win it, then Klinsmann would find some breathing room. Winning the first game in a somewhat tough group (with Costa Rica and Paraguay) would be a massive step in the right direction.

Colombia is also looking to build on recent success. Two quarterfinal places, in the World Cup and then last summer's Copa America, vaulted Colombia back into the international spotlight. Although Falcao, Jackson Martinez and several other veterans will be out, Colombia will still have David Ospina in goal and James Rodriguez, Juan Cuadrado and Carlos Bacca in the field. They won't be lacking in talent.

This should be an interesting game tactically and individually. It will be intriguing to see how the US copes with Colombia's outstanding individual talent.

Mexico v. Uruguay (June 5th, 8:00)
This match pits the two front runners in Group C. Mexico, with the easiest travel schedule in the tournament, will be looking to redeem themselves from a bad appearance at Copa America last summer. Juan Carlos Osorio was named manager in October, and this is his first chance to succeed with Mexico on the national stage.

Uruguay, on the other hand, has sent their A-squad. Diego Godin, Luis Suarez and Edison Cavani will all be there.

Both teams will want to beat their main rival for the group in this first game, and get out to a good start. Definite must watch.

Argentina v. Chile (June 6th, 10:00)
Easily the best match of the group stage. A rematch of last year's Copa America final, you can make the case these teams are the best in South America right now. Both teams have also brought the big boys. Arturo Vidal, Alexis Sanchez, Claudio Bravo and Charles Aranguiz will all be playing for Chile. Argentina, on the other hand, will have one of the scariest attacking lineups in the world: Gonzalo Higuain, Sergio Aguero, Angel Di Maria and one Lionel Messi. Although they have defensive concerns, Argentina should be thrilling going forward at least.

This match is not just the most interesting individually, its the most interesting tactical battle. Chile, with the Biesla-esque tactics, is always fun to watch. How Tata Martino meshes all of Argentina's talent, where he places Messi, and whether he tries to adopt the higher, more aggressive system that Messi has thrived under at Barcelona are all issues Martino needs to deal with. This tournament should give him good preparation to experiment, looking forward to the 2018 World Cup.

Honorable Mentions
USA v. Costa Rica (June 7th, 8:00), Argentina v. Panama (June 10th, 9:30) and Colombia v. Costa Rica (June 11th, 9:00) are all interesting matches. Costa Rica will be looking to prove that their performance at the World Cup in 2014 was not a fluke, and Panama will be looking to build on a strong 3rd place at last summer's Gold Cup. Some matches may be fun blowouts, like several of Brazil's potential games, and some may end up close (Brazil v. Peru, Mexico v. Venezula).

One last mention for the potential quarterfinal draws. If Mexico and Uruguay come out of Group C, and Chile and Argentina from Group D, then we are facing some fantastic quarterfinals. We'll see any combination of Mexico/Uruguay v. Chile/Argentina in the quarterfinals, and both will be amazing. Something to look forward to there.

Overall, I'm very excited for this tournament. As a soccer fan, it's a top to bottom interesting tournament. With all the major South American teams, and most of them trying, in it, as well as good CONCACAF teams, it won't be a joke.

As an American, I'm pumped. This is a great chance for players to prove themselves (looking at you, Christian Pulisic). It's a great chance for the team overall to prove themselves. Great chance for Jurgen to relive pressure. Great chance to prep for the Confederations Cup World Cup in 2018. Great chance to finally nail down a system that works, and a rough XI that fits into it. Good chance to test ourselves against big teams, something we'll miss since the whole Gold Cup thing didn't work out.

It should be a fun sideshow to the Euro's, but it'll be more than just a sideshow. This is gonna be a fun summer of soccer.

Saturday, May 28, 2016

2014 Champions League Final: Match Analysis

Image result for angel di maria champions league final
In light of the upcoming La Liga match Champions League final/Madrid derby, I decided to go back and rewatch the 2014 CL final between the same two teams. It was a fascinating match, with two great managers (Simeone for Atleti, Ancelotti for Real) facing off. Although Real ended up winning 4-1, the game was infinetly closer than the scoreline indicates. Real dominated much of the game, controlling the ball and creating more and more chances as the game went on. Atleti, however, gave a masterclass in defensive discipline, and until they ran out of energy kept Real fairly frustrated.

Lineups

Real was without their normal pivot, Xabi Alonso, and Sami Khedira was in doubt after being out for half of the season. Khedira was able to make it back into the lineup, although he only played the first hour. Ancelotti lined Real up in a 4-3-3, with Khedira in the pivot. Angel Di Maria and Luka Modric played on either side of him, although neither stayed close to Khedira. Both, but especially ADM, drifted outside, to balance the inward movements of Real's wingers, Ronaldo and Bale.

Atleti set up in their classic 4-4-2. Their defense, and change to 4-5-1 later, will be discussed below. Diego Costa, in doubt because of a hamstring injury, insisted on playing. Costa only made the first 10 minutes however, costing his team a sub that was desperately needed later in the game.

Real's Buildup
Ancelotti made some interesting tweaks to Real's normal 4-3-3. Without Alonso to stabilize possession, Ancelotti went for a more aggressive, direct approach. Many times either Sergio Ramos or Raphael Varane would play long balls directly to one of the attacking 3, bypassing the midfield. This allowed Real to go over Atleti's strong midfield presence, and with all 3 forwards skilled in the air, it was a somewhat effective strategy.

The midfield 3 were also very uncompact in possession. Both Modric and Di Maria pushed out wide. This balanced the inward movements of Bale and particularly, on Di Maria's side, Ronaldo. The strategy seemed to play into Atleti's hands, as they seek to force teams away from the middle, but Real used wing overloads to break into the center, especially in the final third.

Real also played with asymmetric fullbacks for the first hour of the game. Coentrao on the left pushed very high up the field, while Carvajal stayed deeper, although he did contribute to the offense.

What resulted from the movement on the left was an interesting triangle forming. Ronaldo made runs into midfield, playing mostly in the half space, although he had the positional freedom to roam the field at large. Coentrao pushed high, filling the wing. Di Maria dropped back to fill in Coentrao's open space at full back, while still playing a vital role in the build up.


Here you can see the triangle clearly. Di Maria is deep, Ronaldo is in midfield, and Coentrao is in the attacking line.

There you can see the benefits of the triangle. It created an overload, numerical and qualitative, on the left side, and was difficult for Atleti to deal with.

Much of Real's game up was based on giving Ronaldo, and Bale to a lesser extent, a free role, to float around the field and stay in a dangerous position. The movements of the midfielders, fullbacks and Benzema were all supposed to balance out Ronaldo's free role. Even Bale played around Ronaldo, staying to the wing more when Ronaldo drifted over to the center and right half space.

Atleti's Defense
I wrote a fairly in depth analysis of Atleti's defense in my analysis of their loss at Barcelona this season, so take a look at that for more. But Simeone has changed his defense slightly in the past two years, so its worth taking a look at the differences in this game.

Atleti was much more passive two years ago, in defense, then they are now. Against Barcelona, and against Bayern in the Champions League semifinal this year, Atleti pressed higher up the field, forcing the possession based team backwards and using pressure to disrupt their buildup.

In this game, however, Atleti very much sat in their own half and allowed Real to have the ball. Even their, Atleti was passive, rarely putting pressure on the ball unless it came into midfield. However, their compact 4-4-2 and shifts across the field kept Real out of the middle.

In that clip, Atleti shift with the ball, forcing it to the wings and out of the center. Real pass around the perimeter of Atleti's defense, with Atleti putting little pressure on the ball. It's only when Di Maria tries to dribble through the center does Atleti close him down. Three players collapse on him, forcing a bad pass and a turnover.

Atleti also put on a good counterpress, especially early in the second half when they were trying to counter Real's speed. This hints at Simeone's later developments, where we've seen Atleti ramp up the pressure in recent games.


Later in the game, after Atleti had scored, Real gained more possession and increasingly put offensive pressure on Atleti. Simeone was concerned with Real's penetration of the center, especially from Di Maria's runs, and shifted from a 4-4-2 to a 4-5-1. Adrian, Costa's replacement, dropped onto the wing of the midfield.

While the change helped Atleti regain control of the center and keep Real out of dangerous zones, Atleti lost any semblance of pressure on the ball. With only one forward, Atleti had no access to the ball, and afforded Ramos and Varane, as well as the fullbacks, far too much time to pick out long direct passes. This increased passivity allowed Real to pin Atleti back and back, and even with Atleti, masters of last ditch defending, a team can very rarely hold on by a thread for as long as Atleti needed too.

Di Maria's Increasing Role
Di Maria became more and more important to Real as the game went on. In the initial lineup, he played very well in the fullback/deep playmaker slot he fell into with Coentrao going forward. With Atleti not pressuring him, Di Maria was free to playmake and create chances on and off the ball for the attackers. 

Atleti also struggled to deal with Di Maria's running ability on the ball. He time and time again cut through Atleti's lines, breaking into the center of the field, like below.

Di Maria was also Real's primary threat on the counter. When they countered, Ronaldo, Benzema and Bale were all fairly central, usually with the two wingers in the half spaces. It was a very well structured counter, balanced across the field. Di Maria usually led the counter, with the ball, from the wing. He is one of the few players in the world who can beat Atleti's superb 1 v. 1 defenders, and thus was able to break Atleti's counterpress and break Real out onto a counterattack.

Bale's goal, and what was eventually the game winner, came off a Di Maria counter attack. ADM dribbles past three Atleti players, a sight rarely seen, before taking a shot. Courtois saves easily, although he probably could have done better to knock it out of the danger area. Bale swoops in and head the rebound in, to win Real the decima.

Ancelotti's Subs
After an hour Ancelotti made some key substitutions. He brought off Khedira, partially out of concerns for aggravating his injury, and Coentrao for Isco and Marcelo, respectively.

Isco was a more attack minded player, reflecting the flow of the game. By that point, Atleti had failed to mount a serious counter for at least 10 minutes, and Real were in complete control. Ancelotti could afford to sacrifice Khedira, a defensive pivot, or Isco, more a number 10. The change allowed Real to create better chances in possession.

Marcelo's entrance was interesting as well. He played almost as an inverted fullback (like we've seen Phillip Lahm do under Pep at Bayern), as you can see in the clip below. He played in the halfspace, opening room on the wing for Di Maria.

Ancelotti still used a sort of triangle, as he had with Coentrao. It changed slightly, however, with Ronaldo still in midfield. Marcelo, as we've seen, also moved into midfield, a bit deeper than Ronaldo, while Di Maria shifted onto the wing. This triangle was, as it had been, the main focus of Real's build up, and gave both Di Maria and Ronaldo freedom to create.

In the above clip, you can see how the triangle allowed each player to play off the other. Atleti was very focused on Ronaldo, and when the ball is moved into him he wisely quickly plays it back out onto the wing. Di Maria and Marcelo make complementary runs, opening space for the other to dribble into.

Conclusion
In the end, Atleti simply ran out of gas and heart. Ramos' 93 minute equalizer was killer, a stab in the heart for Simeone's team. Despite the massive letdown, though, Atleti managed to keep even with Real for the first extra time period. However, with no subs left and several players struggling with fatigue, Atleti couldn't hold on. Real had fresher legs, and their counter attacks ended the game. After Bale scored, Atleti just lost all heart. Real's third goal was the most open I've ever seen Atleti, with almost no one moving to close down Marcelo as he dribbled down the middle of the field.

It was a fantastic game, and provides interesting context for this one. Hopefully Simeone v. Zidane will be as intriguing as Simeone v. Ancelotti was. 

Sunday, May 8, 2016

Lacking a System: Thoughts on Chelsea-Sunderland

Another weekend, another disappointing loss. We somehow lost, 3-2, at Sunderland, a team that fights for relegation every year like Sisyphus rolling his stone up the eternal hill. I believe our performance illuminates a recurring issue of the team under Hiddink. We have no system, no real approach to playing, and thus we have no stability.

The game seemed in hand for much of the first half. After a period of early discomfort and pressure from Sunderland, and an inexplicable yellow card for Gary Cahill, we settled into the game. Diego scored in the 14th minute, and Hazard looked like the Hazard of last season. Fabregas was playing well, we controlled midfield somewhat well, and were limiting Sunderland's chances.

Then, after 5 minutes or so of decent pressure, Sunderland scored just before half. In the minutes after the goal and before half, they pressed us harder and harder, forcing more and more mistakes. They were on the ascendancy, and would surely go into halftime with all the momentum.

But then we hit them once on the counter, Matic took two great touches and finished to make the score 2-1 again. Sunderland lost all the air in their sails, and instead of going into the dressing room pumped, they entered deflated.

We came out and again dominated the early portions of the second half. But they steadily grew in influence, gaining more possession, although they weren't able to get many chances.

Then, just as suddenly as Matic's goal had come, first Borini and then Defoe scored in two minutes, to take the lead. In the 66th minute we were in control, cruising to 3 points. In the 70th we were underdogs, fighting for 1.

For the rest of the game we had little to offer. Sunderland soaked up our pressure, and unsurprisingly (given our complete lack of a coherent counterpress or even just good counterpressing defensive midfielders) were able to get several chances off counter attacks.

The quick ups and downs, ebs and flows, of the game exemplefied a recurring issue of Hiddink's time. We are playing without an identity, without a system. We don't know what we are. We play generic, youth level soccer, with no overall philosophy. Under Carlo Ancelotti, we played attacking, possession based football. Under Mourinho we were defensive, lighting quick on the counter attack. Even Andre Villas Boas, a disastrously bad tenure, tried to install a style of play.

For all of the talk of the "stability" and "calm" Hiddink has brought to the club, in the dressing room and off the field, he has failed to transfer those qualities to the on field product. Chelsea has been anything but stable.

We are prone to massive shifts of momentum in games, both for good and for bad. The match against Tottenham, last week, and the second leg against PSG are also good examples. Against both teams we were locked out of much of the game by superior teams. Their offensive structures allowed them to retain possession well, and when they lost it they were in good shape to counterpress.

We, on the other hand, had a weak defensive shape, with poor access to the ball, and struggled to pressure either team. However, for certain periods of the games, in 5-10 minute stretches, we were able to rachet up the intensity of the game (both homes matches) and put pressure onto the visitors. We pressed in a haphazard and unstructured manner, but, in small doses, it was effective in forcing turnovers and getting us chances on the counter.

But in both matches, PSG and Tottenham regained control after 5-10 minutes, and drained the stadium and team of intensity. They controlled possession for long periods, and gradually forced us back into our half.

In both matches, and against Sunderland, we were at the mercy of the flow of the game. We were passive, allowing the match to take us were it would. We did not establish control over the flow and tempo of the game, like the great teams do.

Barcelona, Bayern, Dortmund, Real and Atleti are all so fantastic and dominating because they dictate how games will be played. They have systems that all the players work in and out of. Some, like Bayern, Dortmund and Barca, control games through possession. Atleti does it through not having the ball, by giving other teams the ball and dictating where they put it.

But all of these teams know what their game plan is, know how they are going to play. We, on the other hand, walk out on the field as a group of 11 individuals. We certainly attack and defend together, but with little idea or structure of how we are going to do that.

Our offensive structure is horrendous; our press is poor and uncoordinated when we use it, which is rare; we cannot counterpress, consistently leaving our backline of old, immobile men vunerable to quick counterattacks.

While Hiddink may have brought calm and stability to the players and club, he hasn't done that to the style of play. I would dare to say, and this is a gutsy statement, that Antonio Conte comes into a worse on field situation now then he would've if he had taken over directly for Jose. At least then the players would have not wasted five months playing bland, meaningless, thoughtless football.

Friday, February 19, 2016

Thoughts on Chelsea-PSG 1st Leg

As the Champions League restarted play this week, we faced PSG for the third straight year. This was the first time, however, that we were considered clear underdogs, due to a combination of our poor form this season, and PSG's fantastic play in Ligue 1. They currently sit 24 points clear on top of the table, having lost no games in the league. While this is certainly due to the lower quality of the French league, it is clear that PSG are on a different level this season. They alone can perhaps challenge the Bayern-Barca-Real triangle that has dominated Europe this season.

For a full breakdown of their style, see Tom Payne's fantastic 5000 word analysis for Spielverlagerung (definetly worth the time it takes to read). But, in short, Laurent Blanc has shifted the Parisians from a counter-attacking, individual talent focused style that his predecessor Carlo Ancelotti had installed, into a centrally-focused, possession based team. With one of the best midfields in the world (Veratti, Matuidi, Motta, as well as Rabiot and Pastore), a stellar attack and arguably the best center back pairing in the world in Thiago Silva and David Luiz, PSG has the pure talent to match the best in Europe. On top of that, Blanc has a deep bench at his hands, preventing injuries from ruining the team. His tactics have turned PSG from a brilliant individual side into a machine of efficiency and quality.

Given the opposing form of our teams, the 2-1 loss was, at least on the surface, a very good result. The Parisians were held to just two goals, despite dominating the play, and Mikel scored a vital away goal.

But, while it was a good result, it was not a good performance in my opinion. I am surely in the minority of Chelsea fans here, but I believe that the result was more about PSG's inability to convert good build up to good chances, than it was about our own defensive solidity. Here are my thoughts. They are in no way comprehensive or even really complete, but they're just what I thought about the game.

Poor Game Plan
PSG are incredibly centrally focused. Their 3 man midfield stays in the half spaces and the center, only venturing onto the wing to get the ball. The wingers in the front 3 often drop off into the half spaces, and Ibrahimovic rarely tries to make runs behind the backline, choosing to hold up play and create more. What results is effectively a 6 man midfield. Opposing midfields are overrun, defenders step out of the backline, and space is opened for Angel Di Maria and Lucas to make runs behind.

This doesn't take much to notice, and it is not like PSG suddenly sprang this strategy on us; they've been doing this for several years now. You would think that Guus Hiddink, a world renowned manager, would at least have seen the strategy coming, much less prepared the team for it, and set us up to at least hold our own in midfield.

But no. We made no attempts to stop their build up play, both in their half and in our own.

We did put on an occasional press, but it was flawed from the start. PSG relies on quick passing combinations to beat opponent pressure, and are very skilled at it. We helped make them make these combos easier by both failing to cut off passing options and failing to close down the man on the ball quickly enough.


Maybe this was our strategy however: press after losing the ball to stop PSG from hitting us quickly on the break, not to regain the ball but to simply stop quick counters. And with a makeshift center back pairing of Cahill and Ivanovic (neither known for their athleticism), it would make sense that we didn't want Di Maria and Lucas free running at the backline. But the simple matter is that it either wasn't consistently applied, or wasn't a strategy at all. The second example shows PSG easily passing through our midfield, and if Azpilicueta hadn't tracked Lucas' run we would have conceded.

But what was inexcusable was our awful defending in our own half. If wasn't that we decided to sit back and soak pressure; that would have made sense.

Instead, we played a fairly open defensive shape, with little positional discipline from the attacking midfield trio and Costa.


Both of the above examples show both PSG's superior build up play, and our own horrendous defending. There is no way that any professional team, much less a Champions League level one, should let another team pass that easily in midfield. Because PSG only scored two goals, and struggled to create chances for much of the match, many Chelsea fans believe that we let PSG play their meaningless passes in midfield, then buckled down in the final third and stopped them.

But their build up play was anything but meaningless, and if they had been slightly better in the final third then we would have been buried. I also think, watching the end of the game, that had Cavani started, PSG would have created many more chances. Cavani, not only on his goal but throughout his time on the field, made more runs behind Cahill and Ivanovic, putting distance between midfield and defense, and opening more space for Ibra to work in. This should be a big concern for Hiddink going into the second leg in several weeks.

Strong Peformance from the Fullbacks
Both Azpilicueta and Baba Rahman played great games. They were crucial to the defense, especially given the lack of mobility in the center backs. As can be seen above, Azpilicueta on numerous occasions stopped runs from Lucas in behind the center backs. Rahman was less of a target, surprisingly, although this is probably due to Di Maria, a more centrally focus player, lining up on his side.

Both came into midfield to several times, as well, to help mark Ibra and to counter PSG's overloads. Most importantly, both played fairly mistake-less matches, rarely allowing PSG room to create on the wings.

They played crucial roles in attack. Because we effectively fielded 5 central midfielders and a striker, the width they provided was vital to keep possession and creating chances. Rahman's overlapping run, and the cross that ensued, in the 22nd minute created perhaps the single best chance of the game.

With the news that John Terry will be out of the game on Sunday, and given the great performances, it's hard to see Hiddink dropping either of the two.

Hazard Unfairly Targeted
One of the big consensus points among Chelsea fans after the match was Hazard's "poor performance." I had thought that he had played well, and was very good offensively at the least, so I was surprised by the seemingly universal opinion.

As I rewatched the game, I affirmed my original thought. Hazard was crucial to the 10 minute or so period where we finally found our feet as PSG's initial pressure in the first 20. He retained possession well, and helped circulate the ball back and forth across the field well. He played several crucial passes in that period, including the one that played Rahman through to cross to Costa.

I think his comments in several outlets leading up to this game (where he said he didn't enjoy training at Lille, and said it would be hard to turn down PSG) soured many Chelsea fans opinions, understandably. But was is frustrating is that fans have combined these interviews with Hazard's frustratingly poor form to reach the decision that he should just leave the club. I hesitate to believe that any club should let such a great player go, even if he has been in poor form, for anything other than an exorbiant amount of money.


In conclusion, it wasn't a world beating performance, but neither was it awful. Yes, our defending was quite poor, and more worryingly the game plan was poor, but we were missing Matic, as well as Zouma and Terry. Both Terry and Matic should be back for the second leg, and that should help us to at least contest midfield.

Hiddink now knows what to prepare for. I would expect, given his good performance at the end, that Cavani will start, which will be a major concern for our slow and ailing back line. Hiddink has three weeks to prepare, so there shouldn't be any excuses.

For some more detailed match breakdowns, see Tom Payne's at Spielverlagerung and Miles Olusina's at Outside of the Boot.

Monday, February 1, 2016

Atletico Madrid vs. Barcelona Match Analysis

This was the match of the weekend, and possibly the match of the season so far. Atleti and Barcelona were tied atop the league, and Barcelona had a match in hand, meaning that Atleti needed to get points off Barcelona at the Camp Nou to stay tight to the Catalans.

The game was also a clash of the best defense in the world against what is probably the best offense in the world. The game didn’t let down the hype.

Lineups
Barcelona XI
 Atletico Madrid XI


Luis Enrique lined Barcelona up in their chosen 4-3-3. Messi as always rarely played on the right wing, instead often dropping into midfield and wandering over to the other wing.

Atleti and Diego Simeone used several formations during the game. Nominally they were playing a 4-1-4-1, although, due to their press and compact style, it could change into a 4-4-2, or 4-4-1-1

Atletico’s High Press
Simeone has made Atleti one of the best, if not the best, defensive teams in the world since his arrival in 2011. Key to their stout defense, and contrary to popular opinion of Simeone’s style, is the brilliant press they put on (for more on Simeone’s tactics, see this fantastic article on Spielverlagerung).

Atleti seeks to force the ball onto the wings, or deeper into the opponents half, where they can isolate players into 1 v 1 situations. Simeone has trained every player on Atleti’s squad to be a fantastic defender, so nearly every 1 v 1 situation results in a turnover of possession.




Here you can see, from the outset, Atleti pressing into Barcelona’s half. Notice their man-orientation: each player that Pique could pass to is covered, except for Alves. Griezmann, marking Pique, has also positioned his body to force Pique to pass to Alves. This is another key of Atleti’s strategy: leave one man unmarked, force the ball to him, and then shut him down and get a turnover.




Here Pique has passed the ball to Alves. Atleti move to close him down, with two players pressing him. They also cut off his options to pass forward or into the midfield, leaving just Pique open.



Alves passes back to Pique, who moves it onto the keeper. Notice how Griezmann both cuts off the pass back Pique and closes down the keeper. Two Atleti players are near to Busquets, meaning there isn’t a short passing option into midfield. Atleti leave Mascherano as the free man.




Just as before, Atleti force Mascherano to make the pass to Alba on the wing. All of his other options are cut off. Notice as well that Mascherano only has three options; Enrique would instruct Messi, Rakitic and Iniesta to play deeper later in the match, and this was crucial to beating the high press, as there were more passing options for Atleti to cover.



Here Alba has the ball, but this time, Atleti don’t leave a free man for Alba to pass too. With no options, he makes a pass down the line, resulting in a throw in for Atleti deep in Barca’s half.

It was this high press that caused Atleti’s goal. Barca had the ball in their own half, on the wing, and when Iniesta tried to dribble into midfield, 5 Atleti players closed him down, forcing the ball back onto the wing, where Atleti won a throw. Saul bodied Alba off, and hit a great cross to Koke.

Barca Beat the Press
Simeone took off the press later in the half and into the second half, however, for several reasons. 

One was that his strategy of playing very physical to throw off Barcelona resulted in several of his players picking up yellow cards, and to ensure that they weren’t sent off (which they were anyway), he played more conservatively.

The more important reason is that Barcelona were beating the press, and forcing Atleti back into their own half. Barca did this by patient build up play, moving the ball back and forth across the backline and the wings, gradually pushing up the field.

One of the most important adaptations Enrique made to negate Atleti’s press was dropping the midfield deeper. Busquests dropped in between the center backs and Iniesta and Rakitic both moved into the half spaces and closer to the center backs. Messi also drifted much deeper than we have seen him do in a while, since his days as a false nine under Guardiola.

This helped negate Atleti’s defensive overloads, and opened more passing options for the defenders.
This can be seen clearly in the build up to Barca’s second goal, by the foot of Suarez.




Here Pique again has the ball, and Atleti are shielding his passing options, leaving only Alves open.


Barca work the ball around the field to Mascherano. You can see that this time, however, Atleti is doing a poor job of cutting off his options, allowing Iniesta to drop into space unmarked. Simeone never wants a free man to be in the middle, but rather on the wings where they can trap easier.

Also note Busquet’s position. He has dropped in between Mascherano and Pique, opening another passing option and stretching Atleti’s press, as a midfielder has to cover him and patrol the middle. This opened space in the middle for Iniesta and Rakitic.




Iniesta gets the ball in the middle, and Atleti do an awful job of closing him down. The man who was behind him doesn’t stay close, and the other two closet men stay yards away.




Iniesta passes to Pique, who takes the ball into the right half space. Once again, look at all the room he has. No Atleti player is moving to close him down, leaving him time on the ball.




Alves gets the ball on the wing, and Atleti have been stretched too far the press him adequately. When you give any Barcelona player that much time and space, he will find a killer pass. That’s exactly what Alves does, picking out one of the best passes of the season. Suarez’s run was also perfect. He exploited the lack of horizontal compactness in Atletico’s setup, and when the ball came to him, he positioned himself between the man and the ball, meaning the defender would have to tackle through him to get to the ball. His finish was, as always, perfect.

It was Enrique’s decision to move Busquets, Iniesta, Rakitic and Messi all deeper in midfield that ended up beating Atleti’s press, by negating their overloads and creating more passing options for the defenders.

Atletico Defend in Their Own Half
As the game wore on, and Simeone made the decision to tone the press down, Atleti increasing sat in their own half, defending in a block. After Filipe Luis and Diego Godin were sent off, Atleti played deeper and deeper, although they still were adventurous and pressed on occasion.

Watching it was a master class in team defending, as Atleti remained vertically compact, and in situations horizontally uncompact, as they stretched to press Barca on the wings.



Here Atleti are defending in their own half (this is an early example, but it still fits). The midfield four are compact horizontally, and are staying close to the backline. Atleti’s strong 4-4-2 shape (the extra forward is off screen) forces Barca to the wing.




Now the ball is on the wing. Atleti close down the marker, and all of his forward options, leaving only the back pass open.




Barca work the ball around to the other side, and Atleti’s block shifts over. There aren’t any immediate options forward, except for a closely guarded wing man.

Note, however, the amazing amount of space between Godin and Luis on the ball side. Simeone does not prioritize horizontal compactness, leaving gaps with the risk of shutting down opponents before they can find them. Although Barca turn the ball over here, they would exploit the gaps in Atleti’s backline later in the game.

In the second half, playing with first 10 then 9 men, Atleti still managed to stop Barca from getting any real shots on goal.




After Luis was sent off, Atleti went to a 4-4-1, still a compact formation, but without a good pressing top. After Godin left, they went to a 4-3-1. Both were strong centrally and even allowed for some pressing on the wings, but they did little to regain possession from Barcelona.

Conclusion
In the end, Atletico will be disappointed with the result. They needed at least a draw to keep even with Barca, and the loss will set them down effectively 6 points.

Simeone’s strategy was brilliant, limiting Barca to very few chances, and almost no good ones at that. They were undone partly by their own strategy of physical play, to intimidate Barcelona, which led to two red cards, but also by Barcelona’s amazing finishing. Looking at the xG map, you can see two things: Atleti did an amazing job of holding the world’s best offense to almost no chances, and the world’s best offense converted some very average chances. In the second half, down a man, Atleti even looked the better team until Godin’s sending off, Griezmann nearly scoring an equalizer.



This title race is not over by any stretch of the imagination, and it will be one of the most interesting things to watch over the next months.