Friday, February 19, 2016

Thoughts on Chelsea-PSG 1st Leg

As the Champions League restarted play this week, we faced PSG for the third straight year. This was the first time, however, that we were considered clear underdogs, due to a combination of our poor form this season, and PSG's fantastic play in Ligue 1. They currently sit 24 points clear on top of the table, having lost no games in the league. While this is certainly due to the lower quality of the French league, it is clear that PSG are on a different level this season. They alone can perhaps challenge the Bayern-Barca-Real triangle that has dominated Europe this season.

For a full breakdown of their style, see Tom Payne's fantastic 5000 word analysis for Spielverlagerung (definetly worth the time it takes to read). But, in short, Laurent Blanc has shifted the Parisians from a counter-attacking, individual talent focused style that his predecessor Carlo Ancelotti had installed, into a centrally-focused, possession based team. With one of the best midfields in the world (Veratti, Matuidi, Motta, as well as Rabiot and Pastore), a stellar attack and arguably the best center back pairing in the world in Thiago Silva and David Luiz, PSG has the pure talent to match the best in Europe. On top of that, Blanc has a deep bench at his hands, preventing injuries from ruining the team. His tactics have turned PSG from a brilliant individual side into a machine of efficiency and quality.

Given the opposing form of our teams, the 2-1 loss was, at least on the surface, a very good result. The Parisians were held to just two goals, despite dominating the play, and Mikel scored a vital away goal.

But, while it was a good result, it was not a good performance in my opinion. I am surely in the minority of Chelsea fans here, but I believe that the result was more about PSG's inability to convert good build up to good chances, than it was about our own defensive solidity. Here are my thoughts. They are in no way comprehensive or even really complete, but they're just what I thought about the game.

Poor Game Plan
PSG are incredibly centrally focused. Their 3 man midfield stays in the half spaces and the center, only venturing onto the wing to get the ball. The wingers in the front 3 often drop off into the half spaces, and Ibrahimovic rarely tries to make runs behind the backline, choosing to hold up play and create more. What results is effectively a 6 man midfield. Opposing midfields are overrun, defenders step out of the backline, and space is opened for Angel Di Maria and Lucas to make runs behind.

This doesn't take much to notice, and it is not like PSG suddenly sprang this strategy on us; they've been doing this for several years now. You would think that Guus Hiddink, a world renowned manager, would at least have seen the strategy coming, much less prepared the team for it, and set us up to at least hold our own in midfield.

But no. We made no attempts to stop their build up play, both in their half and in our own.

We did put on an occasional press, but it was flawed from the start. PSG relies on quick passing combinations to beat opponent pressure, and are very skilled at it. We helped make them make these combos easier by both failing to cut off passing options and failing to close down the man on the ball quickly enough.


Maybe this was our strategy however: press after losing the ball to stop PSG from hitting us quickly on the break, not to regain the ball but to simply stop quick counters. And with a makeshift center back pairing of Cahill and Ivanovic (neither known for their athleticism), it would make sense that we didn't want Di Maria and Lucas free running at the backline. But the simple matter is that it either wasn't consistently applied, or wasn't a strategy at all. The second example shows PSG easily passing through our midfield, and if Azpilicueta hadn't tracked Lucas' run we would have conceded.

But what was inexcusable was our awful defending in our own half. If wasn't that we decided to sit back and soak pressure; that would have made sense.

Instead, we played a fairly open defensive shape, with little positional discipline from the attacking midfield trio and Costa.


Both of the above examples show both PSG's superior build up play, and our own horrendous defending. There is no way that any professional team, much less a Champions League level one, should let another team pass that easily in midfield. Because PSG only scored two goals, and struggled to create chances for much of the match, many Chelsea fans believe that we let PSG play their meaningless passes in midfield, then buckled down in the final third and stopped them.

But their build up play was anything but meaningless, and if they had been slightly better in the final third then we would have been buried. I also think, watching the end of the game, that had Cavani started, PSG would have created many more chances. Cavani, not only on his goal but throughout his time on the field, made more runs behind Cahill and Ivanovic, putting distance between midfield and defense, and opening more space for Ibra to work in. This should be a big concern for Hiddink going into the second leg in several weeks.

Strong Peformance from the Fullbacks
Both Azpilicueta and Baba Rahman played great games. They were crucial to the defense, especially given the lack of mobility in the center backs. As can be seen above, Azpilicueta on numerous occasions stopped runs from Lucas in behind the center backs. Rahman was less of a target, surprisingly, although this is probably due to Di Maria, a more centrally focus player, lining up on his side.

Both came into midfield to several times, as well, to help mark Ibra and to counter PSG's overloads. Most importantly, both played fairly mistake-less matches, rarely allowing PSG room to create on the wings.

They played crucial roles in attack. Because we effectively fielded 5 central midfielders and a striker, the width they provided was vital to keep possession and creating chances. Rahman's overlapping run, and the cross that ensued, in the 22nd minute created perhaps the single best chance of the game.

With the news that John Terry will be out of the game on Sunday, and given the great performances, it's hard to see Hiddink dropping either of the two.

Hazard Unfairly Targeted
One of the big consensus points among Chelsea fans after the match was Hazard's "poor performance." I had thought that he had played well, and was very good offensively at the least, so I was surprised by the seemingly universal opinion.

As I rewatched the game, I affirmed my original thought. Hazard was crucial to the 10 minute or so period where we finally found our feet as PSG's initial pressure in the first 20. He retained possession well, and helped circulate the ball back and forth across the field well. He played several crucial passes in that period, including the one that played Rahman through to cross to Costa.

I think his comments in several outlets leading up to this game (where he said he didn't enjoy training at Lille, and said it would be hard to turn down PSG) soured many Chelsea fans opinions, understandably. But was is frustrating is that fans have combined these interviews with Hazard's frustratingly poor form to reach the decision that he should just leave the club. I hesitate to believe that any club should let such a great player go, even if he has been in poor form, for anything other than an exorbiant amount of money.


In conclusion, it wasn't a world beating performance, but neither was it awful. Yes, our defending was quite poor, and more worryingly the game plan was poor, but we were missing Matic, as well as Zouma and Terry. Both Terry and Matic should be back for the second leg, and that should help us to at least contest midfield.

Hiddink now knows what to prepare for. I would expect, given his good performance at the end, that Cavani will start, which will be a major concern for our slow and ailing back line. Hiddink has three weeks to prepare, so there shouldn't be any excuses.

For some more detailed match breakdowns, see Tom Payne's at Spielverlagerung and Miles Olusina's at Outside of the Boot.

Monday, February 1, 2016

Atletico Madrid vs. Barcelona Match Analysis

This was the match of the weekend, and possibly the match of the season so far. Atleti and Barcelona were tied atop the league, and Barcelona had a match in hand, meaning that Atleti needed to get points off Barcelona at the Camp Nou to stay tight to the Catalans.

The game was also a clash of the best defense in the world against what is probably the best offense in the world. The game didn’t let down the hype.

Lineups
Barcelona XI
 Atletico Madrid XI


Luis Enrique lined Barcelona up in their chosen 4-3-3. Messi as always rarely played on the right wing, instead often dropping into midfield and wandering over to the other wing.

Atleti and Diego Simeone used several formations during the game. Nominally they were playing a 4-1-4-1, although, due to their press and compact style, it could change into a 4-4-2, or 4-4-1-1

Atletico’s High Press
Simeone has made Atleti one of the best, if not the best, defensive teams in the world since his arrival in 2011. Key to their stout defense, and contrary to popular opinion of Simeone’s style, is the brilliant press they put on (for more on Simeone’s tactics, see this fantastic article on Spielverlagerung).

Atleti seeks to force the ball onto the wings, or deeper into the opponents half, where they can isolate players into 1 v 1 situations. Simeone has trained every player on Atleti’s squad to be a fantastic defender, so nearly every 1 v 1 situation results in a turnover of possession.




Here you can see, from the outset, Atleti pressing into Barcelona’s half. Notice their man-orientation: each player that Pique could pass to is covered, except for Alves. Griezmann, marking Pique, has also positioned his body to force Pique to pass to Alves. This is another key of Atleti’s strategy: leave one man unmarked, force the ball to him, and then shut him down and get a turnover.




Here Pique has passed the ball to Alves. Atleti move to close him down, with two players pressing him. They also cut off his options to pass forward or into the midfield, leaving just Pique open.



Alves passes back to Pique, who moves it onto the keeper. Notice how Griezmann both cuts off the pass back Pique and closes down the keeper. Two Atleti players are near to Busquets, meaning there isn’t a short passing option into midfield. Atleti leave Mascherano as the free man.




Just as before, Atleti force Mascherano to make the pass to Alba on the wing. All of his other options are cut off. Notice as well that Mascherano only has three options; Enrique would instruct Messi, Rakitic and Iniesta to play deeper later in the match, and this was crucial to beating the high press, as there were more passing options for Atleti to cover.



Here Alba has the ball, but this time, Atleti don’t leave a free man for Alba to pass too. With no options, he makes a pass down the line, resulting in a throw in for Atleti deep in Barca’s half.

It was this high press that caused Atleti’s goal. Barca had the ball in their own half, on the wing, and when Iniesta tried to dribble into midfield, 5 Atleti players closed him down, forcing the ball back onto the wing, where Atleti won a throw. Saul bodied Alba off, and hit a great cross to Koke.

Barca Beat the Press
Simeone took off the press later in the half and into the second half, however, for several reasons. 

One was that his strategy of playing very physical to throw off Barcelona resulted in several of his players picking up yellow cards, and to ensure that they weren’t sent off (which they were anyway), he played more conservatively.

The more important reason is that Barcelona were beating the press, and forcing Atleti back into their own half. Barca did this by patient build up play, moving the ball back and forth across the backline and the wings, gradually pushing up the field.

One of the most important adaptations Enrique made to negate Atleti’s press was dropping the midfield deeper. Busquests dropped in between the center backs and Iniesta and Rakitic both moved into the half spaces and closer to the center backs. Messi also drifted much deeper than we have seen him do in a while, since his days as a false nine under Guardiola.

This helped negate Atleti’s defensive overloads, and opened more passing options for the defenders.
This can be seen clearly in the build up to Barca’s second goal, by the foot of Suarez.




Here Pique again has the ball, and Atleti are shielding his passing options, leaving only Alves open.


Barca work the ball around the field to Mascherano. You can see that this time, however, Atleti is doing a poor job of cutting off his options, allowing Iniesta to drop into space unmarked. Simeone never wants a free man to be in the middle, but rather on the wings where they can trap easier.

Also note Busquet’s position. He has dropped in between Mascherano and Pique, opening another passing option and stretching Atleti’s press, as a midfielder has to cover him and patrol the middle. This opened space in the middle for Iniesta and Rakitic.




Iniesta gets the ball in the middle, and Atleti do an awful job of closing him down. The man who was behind him doesn’t stay close, and the other two closet men stay yards away.




Iniesta passes to Pique, who takes the ball into the right half space. Once again, look at all the room he has. No Atleti player is moving to close him down, leaving him time on the ball.




Alves gets the ball on the wing, and Atleti have been stretched too far the press him adequately. When you give any Barcelona player that much time and space, he will find a killer pass. That’s exactly what Alves does, picking out one of the best passes of the season. Suarez’s run was also perfect. He exploited the lack of horizontal compactness in Atletico’s setup, and when the ball came to him, he positioned himself between the man and the ball, meaning the defender would have to tackle through him to get to the ball. His finish was, as always, perfect.

It was Enrique’s decision to move Busquets, Iniesta, Rakitic and Messi all deeper in midfield that ended up beating Atleti’s press, by negating their overloads and creating more passing options for the defenders.

Atletico Defend in Their Own Half
As the game wore on, and Simeone made the decision to tone the press down, Atleti increasing sat in their own half, defending in a block. After Filipe Luis and Diego Godin were sent off, Atleti played deeper and deeper, although they still were adventurous and pressed on occasion.

Watching it was a master class in team defending, as Atleti remained vertically compact, and in situations horizontally uncompact, as they stretched to press Barca on the wings.



Here Atleti are defending in their own half (this is an early example, but it still fits). The midfield four are compact horizontally, and are staying close to the backline. Atleti’s strong 4-4-2 shape (the extra forward is off screen) forces Barca to the wing.




Now the ball is on the wing. Atleti close down the marker, and all of his forward options, leaving only the back pass open.




Barca work the ball around to the other side, and Atleti’s block shifts over. There aren’t any immediate options forward, except for a closely guarded wing man.

Note, however, the amazing amount of space between Godin and Luis on the ball side. Simeone does not prioritize horizontal compactness, leaving gaps with the risk of shutting down opponents before they can find them. Although Barca turn the ball over here, they would exploit the gaps in Atleti’s backline later in the game.

In the second half, playing with first 10 then 9 men, Atleti still managed to stop Barca from getting any real shots on goal.




After Luis was sent off, Atleti went to a 4-4-1, still a compact formation, but without a good pressing top. After Godin left, they went to a 4-3-1. Both were strong centrally and even allowed for some pressing on the wings, but they did little to regain possession from Barcelona.

Conclusion
In the end, Atletico will be disappointed with the result. They needed at least a draw to keep even with Barca, and the loss will set them down effectively 6 points.

Simeone’s strategy was brilliant, limiting Barca to very few chances, and almost no good ones at that. They were undone partly by their own strategy of physical play, to intimidate Barcelona, which led to two red cards, but also by Barcelona’s amazing finishing. Looking at the xG map, you can see two things: Atleti did an amazing job of holding the world’s best offense to almost no chances, and the world’s best offense converted some very average chances. In the second half, down a man, Atleti even looked the better team until Godin’s sending off, Griezmann nearly scoring an equalizer.



This title race is not over by any stretch of the imagination, and it will be one of the most interesting things to watch over the next months.